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Globally, there is a notable effort to transition the transportation sector to reduce emissions from internal combustion engine vehicles (ICEVs) and move towards electric vehicles (EVs). 

As evidence, more and more EVs are appearing on Irish roads every day. In the discussion about sustainable alternatives to ICE cars, there is no doubt that EVs stand out. 

They are a technologically more advanced and cleaner mode of transportation since they do not pollute the air (NB: various renewable sources can generate electricity to power the EVs; in Ireland, this is mainly electricity generated from wind (SEAI 2021). 

This reduces the greenhouse gases (GHGs) being released into the atmosphere as burning fossil fuels is a primary source of GHGs such as carbon dioxide (CO2), methane (CH4) and nitrous oxide (N2O) (Anandan, 2023). However, a new challenge emerges as Ireland and the rest of the world transition towards this cleaner transportation mode. What will happen to all the EV batteries when they reach the end of their lifecycle? 

According to the Irish Electric Vehicle Association (IEVA), by the second quarter of 2023, Ireland's roads had more than 100,000 electric cars, which included 58,000 battery electric vehicles (BEVs) and 47,000 plug-in hybrid electric vehicles (PHEVs) (IEVA 2023).

Additionally, the Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland (SEAI) stated that for the first time in Ireland's motor history, sales of ICE vehicles were lower than EVs in the first quarter of 2023 (SEAI 2023a). 

The Central Statistics Office (CSO) has highlighted a continuous growth in the adoption of EVs on Irish roads. Its data shows that by August 2023, of all the newly registered cars in Ireland, 19% were BEVs. This is an increase from 13% over the same eight-month period in the previous year, 2022. 

More specifically, in the first eight months of 2022, there were 11,618 BEV registrations, which jumped to 19,021 in the same period of 2023 – a significant growth of 64% (CSO 2023). 

The graph below (see Figure 1) demonstrates the distribution of new BEVs from March to August 2023. The collected data clearly shows that BEVs accounted for 19.9% of all newly registered cars in August alone. NBan increase in June can be attributed to an SEAI grant reduction from €5,000 to €3,500 (SEAI 2023b). Nevertheless, some EV manufacturers, like Tesla, have opted to cover the €1,500 difference, ensuring their new customers still benefit from the total grant (Tesla 2023).  

Figure 1: Distribution of the new cars' fuel types registered between March and August 2023 (CSO 2023). 

The statistics for total registered cars between 2017-2022 demonstrate a clear upward trend in the number of BEVs from 1% to 15%. In contrast, diesel cars experienced a significant drop during the same time frame, a decline from 54% to 27% (exactly half – see Figures 2 and 3).

Figure 2: The percentage of new cars in Ireland by fuel type between 2017 and 2022 (CSO 2023). 

Figure 3: Number and Percentage of the new BEVs in Ireland between 2017 and 2022 (CSO 2023).

Challenges

A concern arises when considering the average lifespan of an EV battery. Typically ranging between 10 to 14 years, depending on the battery chemistry, many early EV adopters will soon face battery replacement. Due to constant charge and discharge cycles, a battery's state of charge (SoC) eventually degrades over time. 

Unfortunately, this degradation will result in a reduced charging capacity and, consequently, the vehicle's driving range (SEAI 2023c). This situation creates the primary environmental concern. 

Expired batteries generate a risk to the environment, particularly damaged lithium batteries, which are extremely hazardous and demand careful handling and disposal. 

Currently, EVs mostly use three types of batteries: lithium-iron-phosphate (LFP), nickel-manganese-cobalt (NMC) and nickel-cobalt-aluminium (NCA) (see Table 1). These batteries contain potentially dangerous chemicals such as lithium (Li), nickel (Ni) and cobalt (Co), increasing the magnitude of the disposal challenge (Man 2023).

Table 1: Different EV battery chemistries and attributes (Man 2023).

This creates a fundamental question: how are various types of batteries recycled (including expired, faulty and damaged ones)? According to Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE) Ireland, the organisation sends a specially trained team equipped with the necessary Personal Protective Equipment (PPE) and tools to safely handle, store and transport these battery packs for recycling (WEEE Ireland 2023). 

They are collaborating with contractors like ELV Environmental Services CLG (ELVES), who are fully permitted to collect such units for decommissioning.  Given the rigorous regulations, transporting certain batteries, such as damaged lithium ones, is quite challenging.  

All contractors are bound by the Carriage of Dangerous Goods by Road Regulations (ADR); these regulations require specific packaging measures in place.

Depending on the battery's condition, special containers might be needed. For example, when dealing with damaged EV lithium batteries, a specialised storage container such as the LiBa®Box is used – see Figure 4 (NB: this example costs more than €14,000) (Gelkoh 2023.)

Figure 4: Different LiBa®Box sizes (Gelkoh 2023).

However, there is an important point to consider. These batteries are not transported to the Irish recycling facilities but to Europe. In a correspondence to WEEE Ireland (Oct 2023), the head of batteries and projects informed that these batteries are sent to Accurec Recycling GmbH in Germany (Accurec 2023). 

This is done by K Metals Recycling (KMK 2023). KMK adheres to the TFS (trans-frontier shipment) regulations to manage this process and ensures a DGSA (dangerous goods safety adviser) is involved. Furthermore, the International Maritime Dangerous Goods Act (IMDG) supervises the final shipment to European processing plants. Directing this complicated and highly regulated process is quite challenging on its own. 

Future goals

This situation creates an opportunity for Ireland. On the one hand, decommissioning batteries present environmental risks, but on the other hand, there is an economic prospect associated with these batteries. 

The economic opportunity is in recovering and reusing the materials contained within these EV batteries. Ireland could capitalise on this by recycling batteries and repurposing their components in other applications, such as second life batteries (SLB). 

As presented in Haram et al (2021), once EV batteries reach around three-quarters of their nominal capacity (~70-80%), it is considered to have ended its primary life. Even the batteries with a lower state of health (SOH) still possess value depending on their condition

They can be adapted for secondary applications, such as supporting power in grid-scale photovoltaic (PV) plants or residential properties. The challenge is that repurposing them requires some upgrades and modifications, as most industry systems work at voltages between 800–1000 V. Figure 5 presents SLB applications, comparing the recycled industry with the EV battery system requirements. 

Figure 5: SLB applications/EV battery system requirements (Haram et al 2021). 

The EV batteries mentioned above, such as LFP, NMC or NCA, are made up of various components, each presenting distinct recycling challenges and requirements. 

While some of these components can be recycled with current technologies, others require more complicated and demanding procedures to recover the desired materials.  

As highlighted by Crownhart (2023), recycling facilities can recover more than 80% of lithium and almost all nickel and cobalt from decommissioned batteries.

Additionally, some aluminium (Al), graphite (Gr) and copper (Cu) can be extracted. NB: the recycling facilities can market these recycled materials at almost the same prices as the mined resources. 

For example, in (Leal et al 2023), the components of the lithium-ion batteries (LIB) consist of the aluminium current collector, usually a lithium compound such as lithium-cobalt oxide (LiCoO2) for cathode and the copper current collector and graphite serving as the anode (see Figure 6). 

Figure 6: Components of the lithium-ion batteries (LIB) (Leal et al. 2023). Cathode (+); Separator; Anode (-).

Figure 7 illustrates a detailed recycling process for LIB. Accurec Recycling GmbH executes this process in Germany, the destination for decommissioned Irish batteries (Accurec 2023).

Figure 7: Recycling of LIB (Accurec 2023). 

The Circular Energy Storage (CES) forecasts that the market for LIBs will keep growing and by 2030 (see Figure 8), it is estimated that 77% of the total LIBs installed volume will come from the EVs (Leal et al 2023).

Figure 8. Accumulative SLB volume (Haram et al 2021). 

Along with the advancements in battery technologies for BEVs, recycling methods must also evolve. Developing environmentally friendly processes that allow recycled materials to be repurposed efficiently with technical applications is essential. Implementing an ecofriendly approach is necessary in a circular economic model that promotes sustainable economic growth (see Figure 9) (Leal et al 2023).

Figure 9. LIBs Circular Economy (Leal et al 2023). 

Call to action

The main concern is that once an EV battery ends its lifecycle and is decommissioned, it is shipped to a recycling plant in Germany. Though this might seem like an attractive option, it is effectively a short-term solution. 

First, transporting used or damaged batteries presents an environmental risk; there is the constant threat that toxic elements from the batteries, such as cobalt or lithium, could contaminate the water or soil (NB: the transportation process itself by road and sea adds a carbon footprint.)

Second, Ireland is letting go of valuable recyclable materials that could be repurposed for domestic industries. This challenge could become an opportunity where the EV batteries are recycled here, not sending the problem away.  

As presented by Corrigan (2023), Ireland’s engineering Research and Development (R&D) ecosystem is remarkably strong and backed by organisations such as Enterprise Ireland, Science Foundation (SFI) Ireland, Industrial Development Agency (IDA) Ireland and Irish universities. 

Furthermore, enhanced with a pool of ambitious and highly educated engineers, Ireland could set up its own recycling facilities. By promoting and investing in R&D, developing partnerships with industry investors, academic organisations and government (ie, industry-academia-government collaborations), Ireland could establish facilities tailored for the Irish and later European markets. 

This would lead to the beginning of a new industrial sector, creating jobs and ensuring environmental protection. Several prospects include the utilisation of SLBs for less intensive applications, such as grid storage, energy storage for renewable energy systems or backup power sources (Haram et al 2021).

Using these batteries in secondary applications can extend their lifespan, therefore maximising their effectiveness and delaying their disposal phase and, in a situation of completely degraded SLBs, extracting and reprocessing valuable materials. Moreover, this entire effort would drive R&D in creating more sustainable EV battery technologies.

In order to be successful, this challenge requires a multi-layered approach. First, it is vital to educate EV owners about correct battery disposal practices and offer incentives to return their used battery packs for recycling (the general public must also be aware of these opportunities).

Second, it is necessary to implement robust regulations ensuring that every stakeholder, from manufacturers to final users, plays their part responsibly. 

Last, establishing international partnerships and collaborations. While Ireland is well able to develop its own SLB applications and establish a recycling infrastructure, it could also benefit significantly from global cooperative projects, public research and best practices from around the world.

In conclusion, while promising a sustainable and greener future, the EV revolution also introduces the task of managing and recycling decommissioned EV batteries. 

Ireland certainly has the resources to take proactive steps by recognising the potential risk of the used batteries and turning this into a significant opportunity (ie, an environmental challenge transformed into an industrial prospect). It is an opportunity to protect Ireland’s environment and drive economic, innovative and sustainable growth. 

Author: Adrian Szlapka, a professional with a decade of experience in the medtech industry, is a QA specialist at Abbott Diagnostic, Co Longford. He is in the final year of a Science and Technology Studies degree at the University of Galway. 

References

Journals articles/books

Haram, M.H.S.M., Lee, J.W., Ramasamy, G., Ngu, E.E., Thiagarajah, S.P. and Lee, Y.H. (2021) ‘Feasibility of utilising second life EV batteries: Applications, lifespan, economics, environmental impact, assessment, and challenges’, Alexandria Engineering Journal60(5), pp.4517-4536, available: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1110016821001757 [accessed 1 Oct 23].

Leal, V.M., Ribeiro, J.S., Coelho, E.L.D. and Freitas, M.B.J.G. (2023) ‘Recycling of spent lithium-ion batteries as a sustainable solution to obtain raw materials for different applications’. Journal of Energy Chemistry79, pp.118-134, available: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Eld-Coelho/publication/362627937_Review_Recycling_of_spent_lithium-ion_batteries_as_a_sustainable_solution_to_obtain_raw_materials_for_different_applications/links/64355740609c170a130ce3c5/Review-Recycling-of-spent-lithium-ion-batteries-as-a-sustainable-solution-to-obtain-raw-materials-for-different-applications.pdf [accessed 17 Oct 23].

Internet sources

Accurec (2023) Accurec Battery Recycling, Accurec-Recycling GmbH, available: https://accurec.de/?lang=en [accessed 17 Oct 23].

Anandan, V. (2023) The Effects of Internal Combustion Engines on the Environment, Delta-Q Technologies, available: https://delta-q.com/industry-news/the-effects-of-internal-combustion-engines-on-the-environment/ [accessed 16 Oct 23].

Corrigan, E. (2023) Researching and developing Ireland’s engineering ecosystem: Supporting Ireland’s R&D ecosystem is crucial to maintain a competitive edge, The Irish Times, available: https://www.irishtimes.com/special-reports/2023/05/26/researching-and-developing-irelands-engineering-ecosystem/ [accessed 18 Oct 23].

Crownhart, C. (2023) Battery recycling: 10 Breakthrough Technologies 2023, MIT Technology Review, available: https://www.technologyreview.com/2023/01/09/1064886/battery-recycling-10-breakthrough-technologies-2023/ [accessed 17 Oct 23].

CSO (2023) Vehicles licensed for the first time August 2023, Central Statistics Office, available: https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-vlftm/vehicleslicensedforthefirsttimeaugust2023/ [accessed 12 Oct 23].

ELVES (2023) About ELVES, End-of-Life Vehicles Environmental Services CLG, available: https://www.elves.ie/en/about-elves [accessed 17 Oct 23].

Enterprise Ireland (2023) Funding Supports, Enterprise Ireland, available: https://www.enterprise-ireland.com/en/ [accessed 18 Oct 23].

Gelkoh (2023) LiBa®Box, Approval for the transport of critical lithium batteries( LP906/ADR ), wpml.org, available: https://www.kmk.ie/home [accessed 17 Oct 23].

IDA Ireland (2023) A Smooth, Fast and Successful Set-up for Your Operations in Europe, Industrial Development Agency Ireland, available: https://www.idaireland.com/ [accessed 18 Oct 23].

IEVA (2023) 58000 BEVs registered on Irish Roads, Irish Electric Vehicle Association, available: https://www.irishevassociation.ie/#:~:text=As%20of%20mid%20year%202023,you're%20in%20good%20company [accessed 12 Oct 23].

KMK (2023) Electrical, electronics & metals waste management solutions, KMK Metals Recycling Ltd., available: https://www.kmk.ie/home [accessed 17 Oct 23].

Man, H. (2023) What are LFP, NMC, NCA Batteries in Electric Cars?, Zecar, available: https://zecar.com/resources/what-are-lfp-nmc-nca-batteries-in-electric-cars [accessed 17 Oct 23].

SEAI (2021) Renewables, Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland, Rialtas na hEirann (Government of Ireland), available: https://www.seai.ie/data-and-insights/seai-statistics/key-statistics/renewables/#comp00005c6fef2300000035f11bda accessed 19 Oct 23].

SEAI (2023a) Direction of Travel - the growing EV markets in Ireland, Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland, Rialtas na hEirann (Government of Ireland), available:    https://www.seai.ie/blog/ev-direction-of-travel/#:~:text=In%202022%2C%20one%20in%20five,sink%20in%20for%20a%20moment[accessed 12 Oct 23].

SEAI (2023a) Understanding EV Battery Life, Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland, Rialtas na hEirann (Government of Ireland), available: https://www.seai.ie/blog/understanding-ev-battery/#:~:text=Some%20Consumer%20Reports%20in%20the,is%2010%2D14%20years)!    [accessed 16 Oct 23].

SEAI (2023b) Electric Vehicle Grant Values, Sustainable Energy Authority of Ireland, Rialtas na hEirann (Government of Ireland), available: https://www.seai.ie/grants/electric-vehicle-grants/grant-amounts/ [accessed 16 Oct 23].

SFI (2023) Shaping Our Future: Delivering Today Preparing for Tomorrow – Science Foundation Ireland Strategy 2025, Science Foundation Ireland, available: https://www.sfi.ie/ [accessed 18 Oct 23].

Tesla (2023) Design Studio, Tesla Ireland, available: https://www.tesla.com/en_ie/model3/design#overview [accessed 16 Oct 23].

WEEE Ireland (2023) Guidance for Long Life Lithium Batteries & Electric Vehicle Batteries, Waste Electrical and Electronic Equipment Ireland, available: https://www.weeeireland.ie/guidance-for-lll-ev-batteries/ [accessed 17 Oct 23].

Infographics

Accurec (2023) Recycling of LIB, [image], available: https://accurec.de/?lang=en [accessed 17 Oct 23].

CSO (2023) Distribution of the new cars fuel types registered between March and August 2023, [image], available: https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-vlftm/vehicleslicensedforthefirsttimeaugust2023/ [accessed 12 Oct 23].

CSO (2023) Number and Percentage of the new BEVs in Ireland between 2017 and 2022, [image], available: https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-vlftm/vehicleslicensedforthefirsttimeaugust2023/ [accessed 12 Oct 23].

CSO (2023) The percentage of new cars in Ireland by fuel type between 2017 and 2022, [image], available:  https://www.cso.ie/en/releasesandpublications/ep/p-vlftm/vehicleslicensedforthefirsttimeaugust2023/ [accessed 12 Oct 23].

Gelkoh (2023) Different LiBa®Box sizes, [image], available: https://www.kmk.ie/home [accessed 17 Oct 23].

Haram, M.H.S.M., Lee, J.W., Ramasamy, G., Ngu, E.E., Thiagarajah, S.P. and Lee, Y.H. (2021) Accumulative SLB volume’ [image], available: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1110016821001757 [accessed 18 Oct 23].

Haram, M.H.S.M., Lee, J.W., Ramasamy, G., Ngu, E.E., Thiagarajah, S.P. and Lee, Y.H. (2021) SLB applications / EV battery system requirements’ [image], available: https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1110016821001757 [accessed 18 Oct 23].

Leal, V.M., Ribeiro, J.S., Coelho, E.L.D. and Freitas, M.B.J.G. (2023)‘Components of the lithium-ion batteries (LIB)’[image], available: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Eld-Coelho/publication/362627937_Review_Recycling_of_spent_lithium-ion_batteries_as_a_sustainable_solution_to_obtain_raw_materials_for_different_applications/links/64355740609c170a130ce3c5/Review-Recycling-of-spent-lithium-ion-batteries-as-a-sustainable-solution-to-obtain-raw-materials-for-different-applications.pdf [accessed 17 Oct 23].

Leal, V.M., Ribeiro, J.S., Coelho, E.L.D. and Freitas, M.B.J.G. (2023) LIBs Circular Economy’ [image], available: https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Eld-Coelho/publication/362627937_Review_Recycling_of_spent_lithium-ion_batteries_as_a_sustainable_solution_to_obtain_raw_materials_for_different_applications/links/64355740609c170a130ce3c5/Review-Recycling-of-spent-lithium-ion-batteries-as-a-sustainable-solution-to-obtain-raw-materials-for-different-applications.pdf [accessed 17 Oct 23].

Tables

Man, H. (2023) ‘Different EV battery chemistries and attributes’, [table], available:  https://zecar.com/resources/what-are-lfp-nmc-nca-batteries-in-electric-cars [accessed 17 Oct 23].

Decommissioned electric vehicle batteries: Ireland's challenge and opportunity

One argument put forward in defence of fossil fuels is that they were a historical necessity, because there was no other viable substitute for much of the 20th century, writes Sugandha Srivastav. We owe fossil fuels a debt of gratitude, the argument goes, because they supercharged our development. But what if I told you there was a viable alternative, and that it may have been sabotaged by fossil fuel interests from its very inception? 

George Cove stands next to his third solar array. Image: Popular Electricity Magazine, April 1910/Low Tech Magazine.

While researching the economics of clean energy innovation, I came across a little-known story: that of Canadian inventor George Cove, one of the world’s first renewable energy entrepreneurs.

Cove invented household solar panels that looked uncannily similar to the ones being installed in homes today – they even had a rudimentary battery to keep power running when the Sun wasn’t shining. Except this wasn’t in the 1970s. Or even the 1950s. This was in 1905.

Cove’s company, Sun Electric Generator Corporation, based in New York, was capitalised at $5m (about $160m in today’s money). By 1909, the idea had gained widespread media attention. Modern Electric magazine highlighted how “given two days’ sun… [the device] will store sufficient electrical energy to light an ordinary house for a week”. 

Harnessing sunlight, 114 years ago. Image: Modern Electrics/Hathi Trust.

It noted how cheap solar energy could liberate people from poverty, “bringing them cheap light, heat and power, and freeing the multitude from the constant struggle for bread”. The piece went on to speculate how even aeroplanes could be powered by batteries charged by the sun. A clean energy future seemed to be there for the taking.

Vested interests?

Then, according to a report in The New York Herald on October 19, 1909, Cove was kidnapped. The condition for his release required forgoing his solar patent and shutting down the company. Cove refused and was later released near Bronx Zoo.

But after this incident, his solar business fizzled out. Which seems odd – in the years before the kidnapping, he had developed several iterations of the solar device, improving it each time. 

Cove’s solar panel in 1909. Image: Technical World Magazine/wiki.

I can’t say with certainty if vested interests were behind it. Some at the time accused Cove of staging the kidnapping for publicity, although this would seem out of character, especially since there was no shortage of media attention. Other sources suggest that a former investor may have been behind it.

What is well known though, is that fledgling fossil fuel companies commonly deployed unscrupulous practices towards their competitors. And solar was a threat as it is an inherently democratic technology – everybody has access to the sun – which can empower citizens and communities, unlike fossil fuels which necessitate empire-building.

Standard Oil, led by the world’s first billionaire John D Rockefeller, squashed competition so thoroughly that it compelled the government to introduce antitrust laws to combat monopolies.

Similarly, legendary inventor Thomas Edison electrocuted horses, farm animals and even a human on death row using his rival Nikola Tesla’s alternating current to show how dangerous it was, so that Edison’s own technology, the direct current, would be favoured. Cove’s Sun Electric, with its off-grid solar, would have harmed Edison’s business case for building out the electric power grid using coal-fired power.

While some scattered efforts in solar development occurred after Cove’s kidnapping, there were no major commercial activities for the next four decades until the concept was revived by Bell Labs, the research branch of Bell Telephone Company in the US.

In the meantime, coal and oil grew at an unprecedented pace and were supported through taxpayer dollars and government policy. The climate crisis was arguably under way.

Four lost decades

When I discovered Cove’s story, I wanted to know what the world lost in those 40 years, and ran a thought experiment. I used a concept called Wright’s law, which has applied to most renewables – it’s the idea that as production increases, costs decline due to process improvements and learning. 

I applied this to calculate the year solar would have become cheaper than coal. To do this, I assumed solar power grew modestly between 1910 and 1950, and worked out how this additional 'experience' would have translated into cost declines sooner.

In a world in which Cove succeeded and solar competed with fossil fuels from the get go, it would have trumped coal by as early as 1997 – when Bill Clinton was president and the Spice Girls were in their heyday. In reality, this event occurred in 2017. 

Solar pioneer George Cove also patented an early tidal power device. Image: Technical World Magazine / wiki.

An alternate century

Of course, this still assumes that the energy system would have been the same. It is possible that if solar were around from 1910 and never disappeared, the entire trajectory of energy innovation could have been very different – for example, maybe more research money would have been directed towards batteries to support decentralised solar. The electric grid and railways that were used to support the coal economy would have received far less investment.

Alternatively, more recent advances in manufacturing may have been essential for solar’s take-off and Cove’s continued work would not have resulted in a significant change.

Ultimately, it is impossible to know exactly what path humanity would have taken, but I wager that avoiding a 40-year break in solar power’s development could have spared the world huge amounts of carbon emissions.

While it might feel painful to ponder this great 'what if' as the climate breaks down in front of our eyes, it can arm us with something useful: the knowledge that drawing energy from the sun is nothing radical or even new. It’s an idea as old as fossil fuel companies themselves.

The continued dominance of fossil fuels into the 21st century was not inevitable – it was a choice, just not one many of us had a say in. Fossil fuels were supported initially because we did not understand their deadly environmental impacts and later because the lobby had grown so powerful that it resisted change.

But there is hope: solar energy now provides some of the cheapest electricity humanity has ever seen, and the costs are continuing to plummet with deployment. The faster we go, the more we save.

If we embrace the spirit of optimism seen during Cove’s time and make the right technology choices, we can still reach the sun-powered world he envisioned all those years ago. 

Author: , British Academy postdoctoral fellow, Environmental Economics, University of Oxford. This article first appeared in The Conversation.

How the kidnapping of solar entrepreneur George Cove in 1909 paved the way for fossil fuels' dominance throughout 20th century

To support the worldwide struggle to reduce carbon emissions, many cities have made public pledges to cut their carbon emissions in half by 2030, and some have promised to be carbon neutral by 2050.

Buildings can be responsible for more than half a municipality’s carbon emissions. Today, new buildings are typically designed in ways that minimise energy use and carbon emissions. So attention focuses on cleaning up existing buildings.

A decade ago, leaders in some cities took the first step in that process: They quantified their problem. Based on data from their utilities on natural gas and electricity consumption and standard pollutant-emission rates, they calculated how much carbon came from their buildings.

They then adopted policies to encourage retrofits, such as adding insulation, switching to double-glazed windows, or installing rooftop solar panels. But will those steps be enough to meet their pledges?

“In nearly all cases, cities have no clear plan for how they’re going to reach their goal,” says Christoph Reinhart, a professor in the Department of Architecture and director of the Building Technology Program.

“That’s where our work comes in. We aim to help them perform analyses so they can say, ‘If we, as a community, do A, B, and C to buildings of a certain type within our jurisdiction, then we are going to get there.’”

PhD candidate Zachary Berzolla SM ’21 (left), Professor Christoph Reinhart (right), and their colleagues have launched online simulation tools that enable urban policymakers to determine what building-retrofit incentives and other measures are needed to bring about a targeted reduction in their city’s carbon emissions. Photo: Gretchen Ertl.

To support those analyses, Reinhart and a team in the MIT Sustainable Design Lab (SDL) – PhD candidate Zachary M Berzolla SM ’21; former doctoral student Yu Qian Ang PhD ’22, now a research collaborator at the SDL; and former postdoc Samuel Letellier-Duchesne, now a senior building performance analyst at the international building engineering and consulting firm Introba – launched a publicly accessible website providing a series of simulation tools and a process for using them to determine the impacts of planned steps on a specific building stock.

Reinhart says: “The takeaway can be a clear technology pathway – a combination of building upgrades, renewable energy deployments, and other measures that will enable a community to reach its carbon-reduction goals for their built environment.”

Analyses performed in collaboration with policymakers from selected cities around the world yielded insights demonstrating that reaching current goals will require more effort than city representatives and – in a few cases – even the research team had anticipated.

Exploring carbon-reduction pathways

The researchers’ approach builds on a physics-based 'building energy model', or BEM, akin to those that architects use to design high-performance green buildings.

In 2013, Reinhart and his team developed a method of extending that concept to analyse a cluster of buildings. Based on publicly available geographic information system (GIS) data, including each building’s type, footprint, and year of construction, the method defines the neighbourhood – including trees, parks, and so on – and then, using meteorological data, how the buildings will interact, the airflows among them, and their energy use. The result is an 'urban building energy model', or UBEM, for a neighbourhood or a whole city.

The website developed by the MIT team enables neighbourhoods and cities to develop their own UBEM and to use it to calculate their current building energy use and resulting carbon emissions, and then how those outcomes would change assuming different retrofit programs or other measures being implemented or considered.

“The website – UBEM.io – provides step-by-step instructions and all the simulation tools that a team will need to perform an analysis,” says Reinhart.

The website starts by describing three roles required to perform an analysis: a local sustainability champion who is familiar with the municipality’s carbon-reduction efforts; a GIS manager who has access to the municipality’s urban datasets and maintains a digital model of the built environment; and an energy modeller – typically a hired consultant – who has a background in green building consulting and individual building energy modelling.

The team begins by defining 'shallow' and 'deep' building retrofit scenarios. To explain, Reinhart offers some examples: “‘Shallow’ refers to things that just happen, like when you replace your old, failing appliances with new, energy-efficient ones, or you install LED light bulbs and weatherstripping everywhere,” he says. “‘Deep’ adds to that list things you might do only every 20 years, such as ripping out walls and putting in insulation or replacing your gas furnace with an electric heat pump.”

Once those scenarios are defined, the GIS manager uploads to UBEM.io a dataset of information about the city’s buildings, including their locations and attributes such as geometry, height, age, and use (eg, commercial, retail, residential).

The energy modeller then builds a UBEM to calculate the energy use and carbon emissions of the existing building stock. Once that baseline is established, the energy modeller can calculate how specific retrofit measures will change the outcomes.

Workshop to test-drive the method

Two years ago, the MIT team set up a three-day workshop to test the website with sample users. Participants included policymakers from eight cities and municipalities around the world: namely, Braga (Portugal), Cairo (Egypt), Dublin (Ireland), Florianopolis (Brazil), Kiel (Germany), Middlebury (Vermont, United States), Montreal (Canada), and Singapore. Taken together, the cities represent a wide range of climates, socioeconomic demographics, cultures, governing structures, and sizes.

Working with the MIT team, the participants presented their goals, defined shallow- and deep-retrofit scenarios for their city, and selected a limited but representative area for analysis – an approach that would speed up analyses of different options while also generating results valid for the city as a whole.

They then performed analyses to quantify the impacts of their retrofit scenarios. Finally, they learnt how best to present their findings – a critical part of the exercise. “When you do this analysis and bring it back to the people, you can say, ‘This is our homework over the next 30 years. If we do this, we’re going to get there,’” says Reinhart. “That makes you part of the community, so it’s a joint goal.”

Sample results

After the close of the workshop, Reinhart and his team confirmed their findings for each city and then added one more factor to the analyses: the state of the city’s electric grid.

Several cities in the study had pledged to make their grid carbon-neutral by 2050. Including the grid in the analysis was therefore critical: if a building becomes all-electric and purchases its electricity from a carbon-free grid, then that building will be carbon neutral – even with no on-site energy-saving retrofits.

The final analysis for each city therefore calculated the total kilograms of carbon dioxide equivalent emitted per square metre of floor space assuming the following scenarios: the baseline; shallow retrofit only; shallow retrofit plus a clean electricity grid; deep retrofit only; deep retrofit plus rooftop photovoltaic solar panels; and deep retrofit plus a clean electricity grid. (Note that 'clean electricity grid' is based on the area’s most ambitious decarbonisation target for their power grid.)

The following paragraphs provide highlights of the analyses for three of the eight cities. Included are the city’s setting, emission-reduction goals, current and proposed measures, and calculations of how implementation of those measures would affect their energy use and carbon emissions.

Singapore

Singapore is generally hot and humid, and its building energy use is largely in the form of electricity for cooling. The city is dominated by high-rise buildings, so there’s not much space for rooftop solar installations to generate the needed electricity. Therefore, plans for decarbonising the current building stock must involve retrofits.

The shallow-retrofit scenario focuses on installing energy-efficient lighting and appliances. To those steps, the deep-retrofit scenario adds adopting a district cooling system. Singapore’s stated goals are to cut the baseline carbon emissions by about a third by 2030 and to cut it in half by 2050.

The analysis shows that, with just the shallow retrofits, Singapore won’t achieve its 2030 goal. But with the deep retrofits, it should come close. Notably, decarbonising the electric grid would enable Singapore to meet and substantially exceed its 2050 target assuming either retrofit scenario.

Dublin

Dublin has a mild climate with relatively comfortable summers but cold, humid winters. As a result, the city’s energy use is dominated by fossil fuels, in particular, natural gas for space heating and domestic hot water. The city presented just one target – a 40% reduction by 2030.

Dublin has many neighbourhoods made up of Georgian row houses, and, at the time of the workshop, the city already had a programme in place encouraging groups of owners to insulate their walls.

The shallow-retrofit scenario therefore focuses on weatherisation upgrades (adding weatherstripping to windows and doors, insulating crawlspaces, and so on).

To that list, the deep-retrofit scenario adds insulating walls and installing upgraded windows. The participants didn’t include electric heat pumps, as the city was then assessing the feasibility of expanding the existing district heating system.

Results of the analyses show that implementing the shallow-retrofit scenario won’t enable Dublin to meet its 2030 target. But the deep-retrofit scenario will.

However, like Singapore, Dublin could make major gains by decarbonising its electric grid. The analysis shows that a decarbonised grid – with or without the addition of rooftop solar panels where possible – could more than halve the carbon emissions that remain in the deep-retrofit scenario.

Indeed, a decarbonised grid plus electrification of the heating system by incorporating heat pumps could enable Dublin to meet a future net zero target.

Middlebury

Middlebury, Vermont, has warm, wet summers and frigid winters. Like Dublin, its energy demand is dominated by natural gas for heating. But unlike Dublin, it already has a largely decarbonised electric grid with a high penetration of renewables.

For the analysis, the Middlebury team chose to focus on an ageing residential neighbourhood similar to many that surround the city core. The shallow-retrofit scenario calls for installing heat pumps for space heating, and the deep-retrofit scenario adds improvements in building envelopes (the façade, roof, and windows). The town’s targets are a 40% reduction from the baseline by 2030 and net zero carbon by 2050.

Results of the analyses showed that implementing the shallow-retrofit scenario won’t achieve the 2030 target. The deep-retrofit scenario would get the city to the 2030 target but not to the 2050 target. Indeed, even with the deep retrofits, fossil fuel use remains high. The explanation? While both retrofit scenarios call for installing heat pumps for space heating, the city would continue to use natural gas to heat its hot water.

Lessons learnt

For several policymakers, seeing the results of their analyses was a wake-up call. They learnt that the strategies they had planned might not be sufficient to meet their stated goals – an outcome that could prove publicly embarrassing for them in the future.

Like the policymakers, the researchers learnt from the experience. Reinhart notes three main takeaways.

  1. First, he and his team were surprised to find how much of a building’s energy use and carbon emissions can be traced to domestic hot water. With Middlebury, for example, even switching from natural gas to heat pumps for space heating didn’t yield the expected effect: On the bar graphs generated by their analyses, the grey bars indicating carbon from fossil fuel use remained. As Reinhart recalls, “I kept saying, ‘What’s all this grey?’” While the policymakers talked about using heat pumps, they were still going to use natural gas to heat their hot water. “It’s just stunning that hot water is such a big-ticket item. It’s huge,” says Reinhart.
  2. Second, the results demonstrate the importance of including the state of the local electric grid in this type of analysis. “Looking at the results, it’s clear that if we want to have a successful energy transition, the building sector and the electric grid sector both have to do their homework,” notes Reinhart. Moreover, in many cases, reaching carbon neutrality by 2050 would require not only a carbon-free grid but also all-electric buildings.
  3. Third, Reinhart was struck by how different the bar graphs presenting results for the eight cities look. “This really celebrates the uniqueness of different parts of the world,” he says. “The physics used in the analysis is the same everywhere, but differences in the climate, the building stock, construction practices, electric grids, and other factors make the consequences of making the same change vary widely.”

In addition, says Reinhart, “there are sometimes deeply ingrained conflicts of interest and cultural norms, which is why you cannot just say everybody should do this and do this”.

For instance, in one case, the city owned both the utility and the natural gas it burnt. As a result, the policymakers didn’t consider putting in heat pumps because “the natural gas was a significant source of municipal income, and they didn’t want to give that up”, explains Reinhart.

Finally, the analyses quantified two other important measures: energy use and 'peak load', which is the maximum electricity demanded from the grid over a specific time period. Reinhart says that energy use “is probably mostly a plausibility check. Does this make sense?” And peak load is important because the utilities need to keep a stable grid.

Middlebury’s analysis provides an interesting look at how certain measures could influence peak electricity demand. There, the introduction of electric heat pumps for space heating more than doubles the peak demand from buildings, suggesting that substantial additional capacity would have to be added to the grid in that region. But when heat pumps are combined with other retrofitting measures, the peak demand drops to levels lower than the starting baseline.

The aftermath: An update

Reinhart stresses that the specific results from the workshop provide just a snapshot in time; that is, where the cities were at the time of the workshop. “This is not the fate of the city,” he says. “If we were to do the same exercise today, we’d no doubt see a change in thinking, and the outcomes would be different.”

For example, heat pumps are now familiar technology and have demonstrated their ability to handle even bitterly cold climates. And in some regions, they’ve become economically attractive, as the war in Ukraine has made natural gas both scarce and expensive. Also, there’s now awareness of the need to deal with hot water production.

Reinhart notes that performing the analyses at the workshop did have the intended impact: it brought about change. Two years after the project had ended, most of the cities reported that they had implemented new policy measures or had expanded their analysis across their entire building stock. “That’s exactly what we want,” says Reinhart. “This is not an academic exercise. It’s meant to change what people focus on and what they do.”

Designing policies with socioeconomics in mind

Reinhart notes a key limitation of the UBEM.io approach: it looks only at technical feasibility. But will the building owners be willing and able to make the energy-saving retrofits?

Data show that – even with today’s incentive programmes and subsidies – current adoption rates are only about 1%. “That’s way too low to enable a city to achieve its emission-reduction goals in 30 years,” says Reinhart. “We need to take into account the socioeconomic realities of the residents to design policies that are both effective and equitable.”

To that end, the MIT team extended their UBEM.io approach to create a socio-techno-economic analysis framework that can predict the rate of retrofit adoption throughout a city.

Based on census data, the framework creates a UBEM that includes demographics for the specific types of buildings in a city. Accounting for the cost of making a specific retrofit plus financial benefits from policy incentives and future energy savings, the model determines the economic viability of the retrofit package for representative households.

Sample analyses for two Boston neighbourhoods suggest that high-income households are largely ineligible for need-based incentives or the incentives are insufficient to prompt action.

Lower-income households are eligible and could benefit financially over time, but they don’t act, perhaps due to limited access to information, a lack of time or capital, or a variety of other reasons.

Reinhart notes that their work thus far “is mainly looking at technical feasibility. Next steps are to better understand occupants’ willingness to pay, and then to determine what set of federal and local incentive programs will trigger households across the demographic spectrum to retrofit their apartments and houses, helping the worldwide effort to reduce carbon emissions”.

Reducing urban carbon emissions by retrofitting buildings

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Ireland’s Programme for the EU Just Transition Fund was officially unveiled recently; the €169m fund will support communities most negatively affected by the move away from fossil fuels and the cessation of commercial peat extraction. These 'designated territories' include the counties of Laois, Longford, Offaly, Westmeath, Roscommon, and the municipal districts of Ballinasloe, Athy and Clane-Maynooth, and Carrick-on-Suir and Thurles.

The fund, which will be in place until 2027, will ensure that nobody is left behind by the climate transition and will promote economic, social, and territorial cohesion in line with key EU priorities.

It will support training and upskilling for former peat workers. For their communities, this funding will enable them to benefit from new green jobs, the development of affordable green energy, the decarbonisation of local transport, and the roll-out of new tourism enterprises. It will also support investment in sustainable agriculture and forestry, the development of SMEs and startups, as well as support for vital research and innovation.

Just transition to a green future

Environment minister Eamon Ryan said: "We have secured €169m for the region in total, including €84.5m of EU funding along with national co-financing, to ensure that we have a just transition to a green future. It is critical that no one is left behind as Ireland navigates towards the net-zero vision set out in our Climate Action Plan. 

"While fairness is at the centre of this fund, and the green jobs, green energy and green agriculture that it can support, we also have to ensure that the transition is quick. If it’s not fair it won’t be quick. And if it’s not quick, it won’t be fair. The two aims have to go together.

"The adoption of this programme represents the culmination of extensive effort at European, national, regional, and local level. I would like to acknowledge and thank all those involved and wish those with the responsibility of implementing the programme every success in the years ahead." 

Jim Conway, director of the Eastern and Midland Regional Assembly (EMRA), said: "Through a targeted programme, working with key stakeholders, this valuable EU and government funding will deliver on the climate, economic and place making objectives of the Eastern and Midland Regional Assembly, aimed at addressing the impacts of the transition from fossil fuels to greener, more sustainable alternatives.

Employment opportunities

"Achieving these objectives will in turn have positive outcomes for those most impacted by the transition in terms of employment opportunities and enhancing the environment in which they live. Working with the Monitoring Committee, EMRA will ensure the effective management of the programme."

Sofia Alves, director of DG REGIO, said: "The Just Transition Fund is a key driver of the European Green Deal, which pushes the green transition towards more inclusive and innovative accomplishments. We are moving away from peat and other fossil fuels in the Midlands because people once dependent on them deserve a reshaped future with new prospects. A total of €169m will kick-start this process through local initiatives."

The programme will be managed by the EMRA, and will focus on three strategic priorities:

  • Generating employment in former peat communities by investing in the diversification of the local economy;
  • Supporting the restoration and rehabilitation of degraded peatlands and the regeneration and repurposing of industrial heritage assets;
  • Providing former peat communities with smart and sustainable mobility options to enable them to benefit directly from the green transition.

Programme for EU Just Transition Fund investment of €169m in Ireland's midlands unveiled

The methane gas issues at Pike River mine were well known, so why didn’t senior management and the board heed them and act? In this article, originally published in the December 2022 issue of OHS Professional Magazine, I explore the organisational lessons from the Pike River disaster. 

It is November 19, 2010, at the Pike River underground coal mine in New Zealand. Daniel Rockhouse is deep in the mine, driving a loader en route to pick up gravel for road repairs.

He stops at the diesel bay at the pit bottom to refuel the loader with diesel and water. Its engine is running. The time is 3.45pm. He turns on the water valve, and as he does so, there’s a white flash.

Then a pressure wave hits him. He’s flung on his back, hits his head, and his first thought is that his loader’s blown up. But then he realises it is still running.

He gets up and turns it off, then sees debris has fallen from the tunnel roof and walls. The air is filled with a pungent smell, and dense smoke starts flowing around him. The atmosphere gets warmer, and he starts to find breathing difficult.

He moves away from the smoke and walks towards a nearby crushing station. The air is clearer there. He reaches for his self-rescuer, a portable oxygen supply, pulls it from his belt, opens it and puts it on.

But it is not working. He gets rid of it, and then moves back towards the loader, but the atmosphere is getting worse. He falls over. He shouts for help. His eyes are watering. His whole body is tingling, and he feels like it is shutting down.

Then he blacks out. Almost an hour later, he regains consciousness. He has feeling in his fingers and toes again, but he is cold and shivering. He tries to move and discovers he is lying in the mud beside his loader.

He rolls over onto his stomach and tries to push himself up, but he can’t – he has no strength. He tries again and manages to get to his feet but falls back into the mud.

This time he pulls himself upright and grabs hold of the compressed air and water lines that run along the wall. He searches for a valve on the airline and opens it – fresh air flows and clears the smoke around him. It relieves the stinging in his eyes.

Then he starts searching for a phone to contact the surface. He finds one and dials the emergency number, triple 5. The phone rings, but nobody picks up, and he is connected to an answering service. He hangs up and, this time, dials 410, the number of the mine’s control room.

Daniel Duggan, who is in charge of the surface control room, takes the call. The time is about 4.40pm. And as Rockhouse is talking on the phone, the underground mine manager, Douglas White, comes on the line and tells Rockhouse to get to the Fresh Air Base (FAB) and contact them from there.

Rockhouse hangs up and starts following the compressed air and water lines on the wall. They will guide him, along the roadway known as the drift, to the surface, which is almost 2km away. He walks in the darkness and opens the compressed air valves as he goes, breathing in the air.

Russell Smith

Up ahead, he sees a stationary vehicle in the drift – it’s a juggernaut loader. A man is lying on the ground beside it.

Rockhouse approaches him: it’s Russell Smith. Smith’s eyes are open, but they’re rolled back in his head. He can hardly speak. He has no helmet or light. Rockhouse gets Smith’s self-rescuer and attempts to put it on him, but he can’t get it inserted properly into Smith’s mouth, so he drops it, stands up, and starts to drag Smith’s body along the drift.

It’s still hard to breathe, and he’s weak, but if he can get to the FAB, it will have compressed air and spare self-rescuers, and he should be able to contact the surface again.

When they find the FAB, Rockhouse props Smith up into a sitting position against the wall, and says he will be back in a second. The FAB is an old shipping container designed as a refuge for workers in case of emergencies.

But when he gets to it, he discovers it is decommissioned. It is no longer supplied with compressed air, the telephone connection to the surface isn’t working, and the spare self-rescuers have been removed.

He is furious. He thrashes around for a while, then walks back to Smith.

He drags Smith along the ground, then pulls him to his feet. He asks him if he can walk. They are still 1.5km from the surface. As they start moving, Smith falls. Rockhouse pulls him back up to his feet. With one hand supporting him and the other running along the rail of the conveyor belt beside him, Rockhouse walks Smith towards the mine exit.

As they go, they keep stopping to look back behind them, checking for lights. They see only blackness. They keep moving, and Rockhouse tells Smith to think about his family, to keep his legs moving for them. After some time, the atmosphere starts to clear – it is getting easier to breathe. It has been 46 minutes since Rockhouse’s phone call.

And then they see it. A blotch of daylight. Streaming in through the entrance. They keep moving. But when they walk out of the mine, they find themselves alone. There’s nobody there to meet them.

Rockhouse gets onto the comms and calls the control room. Help arrives within minutes.

Both men are given oxygen, but Smith is incoherent. Rockhouse simply breaks down.

At 5.13pm, while Rockhouse and Smith are still making their way out of the mine, White, the statutory mine manager, decides to investigate what is happening at the mine’s main ventilation shaft.

This involves a helicopter trip from the Pike River admin area to the top of the shaft, located further up the mountain. This shaft plays a critical role in ventilating the mine: the main ventilation fan is located at the foot of the shaft, deep in the mine, while the secondary fan is located at the top.

The helicopter takes off, climbs up over the trees and heads for a position where White can get a clear view of the top of the shaft. And when he sees it, he realises there has been a massive explosion in the mine – one bad enough to knock out the secondary fan.

And 29 people are still missing. Nothing has been heard from them since 3.45pm, almost 90 minutes earlier.

Warning signs not acted upon

In time, a Royal Commission into the disaster would conclude that a methane gas explosion had occurred in the mine. But the factors that led to it did not suddenly present themselves on November 19, 2010.

For months there had been warning signs that Pike River’s gas management was ineffective.

In this article, we explore why these warning signs were not acted upon and what lessons our organisations can learn from the disaster.

But to start, why is methane an issue, and how is it typically managed?

The dangers of methane

Methane gas occurs naturally in coal mines, forming in coal seams along with other gases. Mining activity disturbs and releases it. If it reaches a mixture (by volume) of 5% to 15% methane to air, it is flammable.

And if an ignition source is present, this can result in an explosion. Ignition sources include sparks from mining equipment or miners bringing contraband, such as cigarettes or matches, underground.

This risk is managed in a number of ways. First, gas drainage can remove or decrease the level of gas in the coal before it is mined. That way, the volume of gas released during mining is significantly reduced.

Second, mine ventilation should provide enough airflow to dilute any gas released and keep it below the explosive range. Third, ignition sources can be removed or managed in areas of the mine where there is the potential for gas.

The overall effectiveness of the gas management system – and it is important to think of it as a system – can be determined by continuously monitoring the percentage of methane in the air. Gas exceedances above 2% are important warning signs that the system may not be working effectively. More than 5% indicates the presence of gas in the explosive range.

The importance of gas drainage

Gas drainage involves drilling boreholes into the coal seam. Over time, gas drains into the borehole from the surrounding coal, then out through a pipeline system that removes the gas from the mine.

And in 2006, Pike River knew that drainage would be required – the methane levels in the coal were high and could not be managed by ventilation alone.

But while Pike River may have been aware of this, they made very little progress in designing or implementing such a system. Even by as late as mid-2010, they had taken very few core samples from the coal, which meant they had no reliable estimates of the quantity of gas they were dealing with. Without this information, they could not properly design the system.

Further, any methane drainage that was implemented was more incidental than systematic. Some boreholes were connected for drainage, but the gas level soon overwhelmed the system. Maintaining it had also become an issue. Pipelines were blocked, and there was no method to measure gas flows.

The system was at maximum capacity by April 2010. Several boreholes were free-venting methane into the mine’s atmosphere. And in October, McConnell Dowell, a contractor on site, found a whistling standpipe emitting gas. This was not addressed by the time of the explosion.

Problems with ventilation

There were also problems with the ventilation system. This system comprised of a ventilation loop, which – at Pike River – drew air in through the drift, past the mining areas, and up the mine’s main ventilation shaft.

This loop had two fans. The secondary fan was located above ground. But the location of the main fan was unusual – the Royal Commission found that Pike River was the only coal mine in the world to put its main fan underground.

And there are very good reasons why they are usually above ground. First, if the fan underground is exposed to methane, it can become an ignition source. Second, if there is an explosion underground, the fan can be damaged, making it hard to re-establish ventilation. Third, if the fan is undamaged in an explosion, but remains in a methane-rich environment, then its sensors will stop it from operating.

Losing the ability to ventilate the mine in the aftermath of an explosion significantly affects the survival chances of anybody who survives the initial blast.

In addition to these concerns, as we will explore, there was an abundance of information indicating that the ventilation system was not effective in managing the amount of gas in the mine.

Concerns raised

The management of methane was clearly failing. And this was well known and recognised by the workers, who repeatedly raised serious issues and demanded action.

On eight occasions in March 2010, there were reports from Pike River deputies concerned that the gas drainage system was inadequate for the methane levels predicted and experienced.

One deputy wrote in an email that “history has shown us in the mining industry that methane, when given the right environment, will show us no mercy”. He went on to say they needed to take gas drainage far more seriously and redesign the entire system.

This concern was echoed by a mining engineer engaged to consult on the drainage system. He wanted work stopped until a risk assessment for continuation occurred.

And there were many concerns about the ventilation as well. In July 2010, a consultant on site, Masaoki Nishioka, found that nobody appeared to be looking after ventilation in the mine. While the ventilation plan called for a dedicated ventilation officer, there was none.

Nishioka noted repeated problems with methane levels, which proved the ventilation system was struggling. He recorded levels that exceeded the explosive threshold of 5% on nine occasions between September 20 and October 15.

And the number of exceedances continued to rise. Deputies’ handheld detectors reported readings of 2% or higher on 48 occasions in the 48 days leading up to November 19, the day of the explosion. Of the 48 readings, 21 were 5% or higher – in other words, an explosive level of gas was recorded 21 times over this period.

Some deputies did report these exceedances, but the information in their reports was not reaching or being heeded by management, with part of the problem being no ventilation officer to collate and respond to all the information.

It was against this backdrop that the board of Pike River made a decision: they introduced a bonus for workers to ramp up production.

The production bonus

Each miner would get $13,000 if one thousand tonnes of coal was achieved by September 3, 2010. If it was delayed by one week, it would decrease from $13,000 to $12,000, then $11,000 the following week, and so on. By November, it would be zero.

This bonus would cost the company $2.3m, but the board took the view that they needed to address credibility problems with production because of over-promising and underdelivering, as they had shipped a mere 2% of what they had initially planned.

But while the board decided to award a bonus, they didn’t ensure it could be achieved safely. A number of risk assessments undertaken prior to mining began confirmed that it couldn’t: very significant safety issues were identified, some critical systems were not yet in place, and others were not working correctly. With this context, we return to November 19, 2010.

The first explosion

Rockhouse was deep in the mine, refuelling his vehicle. In the control room, at 3.44pm, Duggan activated the start sequence of a pump system that supplied water to the mine. Then he went on the comm to those underground.

He was talking to a worker, Malcolm Campbell, when there was an unidentified sound. Duggan then lost all comms. This was the methane explosion.

Underground, Rockhouse saw a bright flash and was hit with the sustained pressure wave. It lasted for 52 seconds.

Smith, who had been late for work and was driving his loader into the mine, was hit by the same pressure wave. He was knocked unconscious, only to be later rescued by Rockhouse.

Both would survive the event – Smith regained consciousness in the ambulance on the way to Greymouth.

The true extent of the disaster, however, would only become apparent when White took his helicopter trip up the mountain and saw there had been an explosion in the mine. This had damaged and disabled the secondary ventilation fan.

In time, the consequences of putting the main fan underground would become apparent: it had failed in the explosion, and with the secondary fan also knocked out, there was no way to ventilate the mine.

The subsequent explosions

Rescue now depended on how safe it was to go into the mine. But the methane sensors underground had ceased reporting, and there was no backup system. Samples had to be taken at the top of the ventilation shaft, but they were not representative of the levels of methane deeper in the mine.

To solve this issue, they drilled a borehole to take samples. And on November 24, five days after the explosion, the sampling borehole reached the heart of the mine. The samples showed it was not safe to send in rescue teams.

And at 2.37pm that very afternoon, there was a second explosion. If any of the missing men had survived the initial explosion, there was no way they could have survived the second.

All 29 men had perished. To this day, their bodies have never been recovered.

The management

Why, despite all of the methane exceedances, did the mine’s management team not heed the warning signs?

Normalisation may have played a role, as it does in many organisations. In the months before the failure, methane exceedances were happening daily.

And as the number of exceedances grew but didn’t result in an explosion, this had the potential to lull those involved into believing that exceedances would never result in an explosion. Normalisation changes our perception of risk rather than the risk itself.

But throughout the Royal Commission’s hearings, management personnel insisted that they did not know about the methane spikes, nor the ventilation problems, because nobody brought them to their attention.

Whether or not we believe these claims, it was certainly the case that while there were reports of issues, Pike River did not have the systems to collate, summarise, analyse, and get this information in front of managers.

The lack of an effective system to pull together information and make warning signs clear almost certainly played a role in the mine management’s inability to understand the true extent of the issues with the gas management system.

And, the failure of the gas drainage, combined with the inadequate ventilation, produced a situation that could only be addressed by mine management. These systemic issues could not be solved by any one individual at the mine.

And it is the management response that creates a sense of inevitability to this tragedy. Without meaningful management intervention, these problems could not be resolved.

There was simply no way for the workers to ‘work safer’ or ‘try harder’ when attempting to manage methane. For every day that mining continued, with the existing systems in place, there was an increased opportunity for a methane exceedance and an ignition source to occur simultaneously.

The health and safety committee

What about the health and safety committee that reported to the board? The committee consisted of the chair of the board, John Dow, who was also the chair of the committee, along with another director, Professor Raymond Meyer.

The committee’s role was to provide strategic oversight on the effectiveness of the company’s approach to health and safety, ensure it complied with legal obligations, and receive and respond to reports of significant incidents.

How did it fail to recognise and respond to the warning signs? It would transpire that the committee, which was meant to meet every six months, had not met for 13 months before the incident.

But even if it had met, it is doubtful if it would have identified the danger. The chair’s view was that it was not the committee’s job to actively seek out and obtain information on health and safety in the organisation from other managers, nor to seek independent advice from outside the organisation.

Dow held the view that managers could come to him with any concerns they had regarding health and safety. He told the Royal Commission they could do so at “company dinners or barbecues”.

The board

But what of the board itself? Were they aware of the warning signs? In order to manage the methane risk, they would have needed information on the effectiveness of their crucial systems, such as gas monitoring and ventilation, and analyses of their high potential incidents, to highlight where their systems were vulnerable.

The board, however, did not receive this type of information. Even though the organisation reported incidents internally, nobody reviewed or learnt from them. And as with the health and safety committee, Dow believed that incidents, including high-potential incidents, were operational issues, and, therefore, up to the management team to deal with.

Further, many high-potential incidents were simply not reported to the board. And while the board did not receive the right information, it did not seek it out either. The prevailing view appeared to be: if no concerns were raised with the board, then there were no concerns.

As with many boards, it received monthly health and safety data from the mine, mainly personal injury rates and lost time incidents. Data that told them nothing about how they were managing the risk of a catastrophic incident. (The causes of these types of incidents differ from those that make up such personal safety metrics.)

The Royal Commission would also find several issues with the board’s decision to introduce a bonus. The obvious one is that it focused squarely on production rather than safety.

Another was the board did not give sufficient consideration to mine ventilation – they did not convince themselves that the available ventilation capacity was sufficient to ensure the bonus target could be met in practice.

Finally, risk assessments undertaken prior to mining began identified significant safety issues: some critical systems were not in place, and others were not working properly. Most of these issues were not addressed before mining began.

Closure

When we examine methane management at Pike River, it is tempting to conclude that the cause of this disaster was simply the mine’s failure to manage a critical risk.

But this conclusion tells us very little about the broader learnings we can take from the tragedy. One way to explore these learnings is to consider the similarities between Pike River and our own organisations.

Take our boards. Boards obviously care about health and safety, but are they judging their ‘safety’ based on personal safety metrics like the Total Recordable Injury Frequency Rate – a metric that provides very little information on the effectiveness of an organisation’s management of fatal or catastrophic risk?

And are our boards actively and meaningfully seeking other information to help them understand these larger risks, such as evidence that critical controls are working effectively?

And, if they are, how meaningfully are our boards challenging the good news in these reports, and embracing the bad? And how likely are our boards, like Pike River’s, to believe everything is all right unless told otherwise?

And do we have health and safety committees that report to our boards? Are they effectively assisting boards to understand the organisation’s risks, or are they instead creating one more layer of separation between the board and the front line?

And what of our management teams? Do they have the right systems in place to identify when and why their systems are failing to work as intended?

How do our managers collect, analyse, and identify the information and data they need to make good intervention decisions before incidents happen? Or are they only focusing on the information that pertains to the organisation’s KPIs? And, if so, what about the warning signs in the rest of the data?

And what about our incentive schemes?

Do our incentive schemes reward production over safety? Putting bonuses in place to drive production without confirming that these targets can be safely achieved carries great risk. Further, our organisations measure what we care about – and workers know this. We may say ‘safety is our first priority’, but are our production metrics sending a different message?

A careful analysis of Pike River gives us an opportunity to turn the mirror back on ourselves. Many of the organisational factors that played a role in this disaster are likely at play in our own organisations.

This article was written by forensic engineer Sean Brady and was originally published in OHS Professional Magazine in December 2022 and can be accessed here.

 

How organisations miss warning signs: Inside the Pike River tragedy

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